Insulating a WTO Investment Facilitation Framework from ISDS by Bermann, George A. et al.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2020 
Insulating a WTO Investment Facilitation Framework from ISDS 
George A. Bermann 
Columbia Law School, gbermann@law.columbia.edu 
N. Jansen Calamita 
National University of Singapore Centre for International Law, lawnjc@nus.edu.sg 
Manjiao Chi 
Xiamen University Law School, chimanjiao@163.com 
Karl P. Sauvant 
Columbia Law School, Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, 
ksauva@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, International Law Commons, International 
Trade Law Commons, Securities Law Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
George A. Bermann, N. Jansen Calamita, Manjiao Chi & Karl P. Sauvant, Insulating a WTO Investment 
Facilitation Framework from ISDS, COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT FDI PERSPECTIVES NO. 286 
(2020). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2690 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
 
Columbia FDI Perspectives 
Perspectives on topical foreign direct investment issues 
No. 286   September 7, 2020 
Editor-in-Chief: Karl P. Sauvant (Karl.Sauvant@law.columbia.edu)  
Managing Editor: Riccardo Loschi (Riccardo.loschi@columbia.edu) 
 
Insulating a WTO Investment Facilitation Framework from ISDS* 
by 
George A. Bermann, N. Jansen Calamita, Manjiao Chi, and Karl P. Sauvant** 
 
Over 100 WTO members are engaged in Structured Discussions aimed at a multilateral framework 
on investment facilitation for development (Framework). The Framework (meant to be a WTO 
agreement) seeks to facilitate investment flows by creating legal obligations for states regarding 
(among other things) enhanced transparency and predictability of investment-facilitation measures 
and regulations, improved efficiency and speed of administrative procedures, and the establishment 
of related ombudsperson-type mechanisms. 
 
It is our understanding that, in negotiating this agreement, negotiators intend to create binding 
disciplines for states, but not to confer enforceable rights on private parties. This raises the issue of 
the Framework’s potential interaction with obligations contained in international investment 
agreements (IIAs), especially in the context of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). In particular, 
could ISDS litigants and arbitrators rely on the Framework’s disciplines to add elements to the fair-
and-equitable-treatment (FET) standard, claim breaches of umbrella clauses, or directly incorporate 
the Framework’s disciplines via most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses? How can the risk be reduced 
that the Framework’s obligations will be invoked by private parties in investment-treaty disputes?  
 
A future Framework can be expected—and needs to state expressly—that it does not cover “market 
access, the treatment and protection of investment or investors, and ISDS.”1  
 
But more needs to be done to ensure that Framework and IIA obligations remain insulated from one 
another. Specifically, negotiators should consider several treaty-interface clauses: 
 
First, an explicit limitation of the scope of the Framework’s obligations, to prevent a breach of the 
Framework from being treated also as a breach of IIA provisions:  
 
“A determination that there has been a breach of this Framework shall not establish the 
breach of any rules on investment protection or investor-state dispute settlement.”2  
 
Second, a limitation on MFN treatment, stating that MFN obligations only extend to actual 
“treatment”, and that the Framework’s obligations do not in themselves constitute “treatment”: 
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“For greater certainty, obligations arising from other treaties do not in themselves 
constitute ‘treatment’ and thus are excluded for the purpose of assessing a breach of this 
Article. Conversely, only measures adopted by a Member pursuant to those obligations 
shall be considered ‘treatment’. Furthermore, the obligations in this Framework shall not 
constitute ‘treatment’ under any other treaty.”3 
 
Third, a provision addressing the Framework’s use as a tool of interpretation, expressly stating its 
inapplicability to the interpretation of IIAs:  
 
“This Framework cannot and shall not serve as a means to interpret any rules on 
investment protection or investor-state dispute settlement.” 
 
As these provisions would be binding among the parties to the Framework, their effectiveness would 
be assured in IIA-based disputes in which investors’ and respondents’ states are both parties to the 
Framework. With more than 100 WTO members in the Structured Discussions (and more members 
joining), the overlap between Framework parties and IIA parties could be sizeable, depending upon 
how many members decide to adhere (and how quickly). 
 
What about ISDS disputes brought by investors from non-adhering WTO members against adhering 
WTO members? To the extent that litigants may seek to use MFN clauses to import Framework 
obligations into IIAs, most IIAs exempt economic integration agreements (such as regional free trade 
agreements) from the MFN obligation. Depending upon the exact wording of the MFN clause, it is 
possible, though not without doubt, that arbitral tribunals might find that the Framework is excluded 
on this basis.  
 
In other cases in this situation, however, in which MFN clauses are broader or investors attempt to 
use the Framework to supplement an umbrella or open-ended FET clause, members can add the 
language below to make clear that the Framework does not create rights for third states or their 
investors: 
 
“The Framework does not create rights for states that are not parties to it or for investors 
and investments originating from such states (or having the nationality of such states).” 
 
Finally, to address the potential use of the Framework in IIA-based cases, whether as a predicate to a 
claim or as interpretive support for one, members can clarify that the jurisdiction to interpret and 
apply the Framework is specifically limited, stating that:  
 
 “The Dispute Settlement Body shall have exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and apply 
the Framework.”4 
 
Unintended and unwanted interaction between a Framework and IIAs is possible. WTO negotiators 
should therefore seriously consider including provisions along these lines in a Framework to insulate 
it from being imported into investor-state disputes. 
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* The Columbia FDI Perspectives are a forum for public debate. The views expressed by the author(s) do not reflect 
the opinions of CCSI or Columbia University or our partners and supporters. Columbia FDI Perspectives (ISSN 
2158-3579) is a peer-reviewed series. 
** George A. Bermann (gbermann@law.columbia.edu) is Professor of Law and Director, Center for International 
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Investment Law & Policy, Centre for International Law, and Research Associate Professor (CIL), Faculty of Law, 
National University of Singapore; Manjiao Chi (chimanjiao@uibe.edu.cn) is Professor and Founding Director of the 
Center for International Economic Law and Policy/CIEPL, Law School, University of International Business and 
Economics/UIBE; Karl P. Sauvant (karlsauvant@gmail.com) is Resident Senior Fellow, Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Investment, a joint center of Columbia Law School and the Earth Institute, Columbia University. This Perspective 
benefitted from discussions in the ITC/DIE Expert Network on a Multilateral Framework on Investment Facilitation for 
Development. The authors are grateful to Evan Gabor for his research assistance and to Makane Moïse Mbengue, Stefan 
Schill and Christoph Schreuer for their helpful peer reviews. 
1 A similar statement is provided by the Joint Ministerial Statement on Investment Facilitation for Development, para. 4. 
2 Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (2019), art. 9.3. 
3 EU-Viet Nam Investment Protection Agreement (2020), art. 2.4(5).  
4 Similar language has been proposed by the EU. 
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